Category Archives: Law and Economics
FE Guerra-Pujol, ‘Coase’s Fable’
ABSTRACT This paper is a sequel to two of my previous works: my law review article ‘Coase’s Parable’ (Guerra-Pujol 2023) and my game theory paper ‘Modelling the Coase Theorem’ (Guerra-Pujol 2013). Here, I make three new contributions to the literature on Coase: (i) I describe Ronald Coase’s insight that harms are a reciprocal problem as […]
Faure and Visscher, ‘Medical liability Under Limited Resources: A Law and Economics Perspective’
ABSTRACT This paper presents an analysis of how limited resources in healthcare should affect medical liability. This has become a significant intellectual question in the debate on how to construct an efficient medical liability system. The question has, moreover, received a lot of attention where healthcare systems face increasing pressure from budget constraints. This was […]
Roee Sarel, ‘Explaining the Global Spread of Collective Litigation: A Law & Economics Perspective’
ABSTRACT This paper was developed for the workshop on ‘The Globalization of Class Actions’ (Stanford Law School, April 24, 2026). It explores possible Law & Economics explanations for why representative collective litigation procedures have spread to over fifty jurisdictions in recent decades. The analysis is organized around a simple cost-benefit inequality: a country might adopt […]
Ruhl and Salzman, ‘Property Law for Positive Externalities: Carving New Sticks for the Bundle’
ABSTRACT Property law has long confronted a troubling puzzle: Why does doctrine focus so much on eliminating harms flowing as negative externalities from uses of property – curbing pollution, nuisances, and other harmful land uses – while largely ignoring the potential to encourage positive externalities? Why such a strong focus on preventing bads instead of […]
Ambrosino, Cedrini, Marciano and Ramello, ‘Celebrating European law and economics: three decades in a long tradition’
ABSTRACT This paper analyzes the intellectual foundations and evolution of the European Journal of Law and Economics (EJLE) over its first thirty years. We first reconstruct the European intellectual traditions underlying law and economics – Enlightenment thought, the German Historical School, ordoliberalism, and comparative institutional analysis – and their role in shaping the journal’s founding […]
Donald Kochan, ‘Litigation Without Romance: An Incentives Story’
ABSTRACT It is a romantic notion to believe that the motivations and drivers of litigation are solely grounded in the pursuit of justice, unaffected by the realities of human nature – including individuals pursuit of self-interest, incentives, interest in identifying and willingness to take advantages within systems that might lead to gains, and the temptations […]
Clayton Masterman, ‘Proportional Recovery And Incentives To Settle’
ABSTRACT Proportional recovery allows plaintiffs to recover damages prorated by some percentage proven at trial. The typical example of proportional recovery in modern tort law is the loss-of-chance doctrine, which allows medical malpractice plaintiffs to recover damages using probabilistic evidence of causation, with damages proportional to the probability of causation they can demonstrate. Advances in […]
Gabriel and Sayantani, ‘Third Generation Rent Control: Evidence from San Diego’
ABSTRACT Evidence of adverse economic impacts of rent control derives largely from older, binding local ordinances of the 1970s. In 2020, the State of California enacted a new rent control law with less binding rent caps among jurisdictions lacking stricter regulations. We use permit, transaction and rental supply data from San Diego to evaluate the […]
Matthew Sag, ‘Copyright’s Jagged Frontier’
ABSTRACT How should law respond to transformative technologies whose benefits are inseparable from their risks? This Article argues that the answer lies not in binary choices between permission and prohibition, but in what might be called zones of contingent permission: legal frameworks that allow deployment of new technologies while requiring measures to detect and prevent […]
Rizner and Krzus, ‘The AI’s Philosophy of Contract: An Empirical Study of Breach, Remedies, and Model Heterogeneity’
ABSTRACT Is a contract a moral promise to be kept or an option to perform or pay? While this question has long divided legal theorists between ‘Holmesian’ realists and promissory moralists, it now faces a new ‘legal mind’: the large language model applied to legal analysis. This Article presents a large-scale empirical study of how […]