ABSTRACT
This paper was developed for the workshop on ‘The Globalization of Class Actions’ (Stanford Law School, April 24, 2026). It explores possible Law & Economics explanations for why representative collective litigation procedures have spread to over fifty jurisdictions in recent decades. The analysis is organized around a simple cost-benefit inequality: a country might adopt such procedures when the expected benefits exceed the expected costs. On the benefit side, the paper considers factors such as the public-goods character of deterrence, the limits of public regulation, regulatory competition, and behavioral herding among policymakers. On the cost side, it examines how technological change, the growth of specialized legal professionals and litigation funders, and the availability of procedural templates may have lowered the barriers to adoption. The paper also touches on how design choices can be understood through this lens.
Sarel, Roee, Explaining the Global Spread of Collective Litigation: A Law & Economics Perspective (February 27, 2026).
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