Bolderson and Kitchen, ‘Class action waivers: contracting out of class action litigation in England and Wales’

INTRODUCTION
This article considers whether businesses can lawfully deploy class action waivers (CAWs) to mitigate exposure to class action litigation involving breaches of competition law in England and Wales. It concludes that, in certain circumstances, they likely can, though the area is ripe for dispute and gives rise to a number of intellectually complex and engaging questions. Given the number of cases addressing this issue in other common law jurisdictions with lively class action regimes (such as Australia and Canada), it seems likely only to be a matter of time before the point falls properly to be tested in England …

€ (Westlaw)

Ben Bolderson and Leo Kitchen, ‘Class action waivers: contracting out of class action litigation in England and Wales’ (2026) 142 Law Quarterly Review 664-688.

Wayne Courtney, ‘Liability in contract for mental distress’

INTRODUCTION
… The treatment of mental distress damages in contract evolved to its present state through a mix of judicial intuition and scepticism, without ever settling upon an organising theory. This article is concerned with the matter of liability – that is, defining the circumstances in which compensation can be awarded – and not the matter of quantification. My objective is to put liability for mental distress in contract on a more principled footing. Section II begins with some definitions. I discuss the present law in Section III. Various rationales have been offered to support the status quo or to argue for compensation to be expanded. I consider some of the more significant ones in Section IV. My argument then comes in Section V. I stop short of exhorting courts simply to use the basic principles of damages to resolve mental distress claims. Something more structured is required: an intermediating concept of interests. The law should award compensation for mental distress when certain protected interests are harmed by breach and not otherwise. The article maps English and Commonwealth case law against the model, to show that the model is viable and to identify interests that are already recognised, overtly or covertly. It also flags possible future developments. The conclusion appears in Section VI …

€ (Westlaw)

Wayne Courtney, ‘Liability in contract for mental distress’ (2026) 142 Law Quarterly Review 640-663.

Steel and Williams, ‘Constructing the no breach counterfactual: the preclusionary rule’

INTRODUCTION
When compensation is claimed for breach of a private law duty, it is typically quantified by reference to a counterfactual in which the defendant did not commit the breach. The ‘preclusionary rule’, as we will call it, is relevant to the construction of this counterfactual. This rule sometimes prevents parties from populating the counterfactual with hypothetical breaches of duty. The clearly established core of the rule is as follows: a defendant is not able to argue that, but for the particular breach of duty which occurred, they would have committed some other breach of the same duty, even if this is what would have happened but for the breach. In addition, the preclusionary rule arguably prevents claimants from populating the counterfactual with breaches of duty owed by the claimant to the defendant in order to establish that they are worse off as a result of a breach. One might be tempted to suggest that all wrongdoing is excluded from the counterfactual, but this is clearly not the law. Whilst it is false to say that all wrongdoing is excluded from the counterfactual, the precise contours of the current rule are unclear. The purpose of this article is to identify the extant uncertainties in the preclusionary rule, explore possible ways of resolving those uncertainties in a normatively desirable manner, and then to restate the preclusionary rule as clearly as possible …

€ (Westlaw)

Sandy Steel and Samuel Williams, ‘Constructing the no breach counterfactual: the preclusionary rule’ (2026) 142 Law Quarterly Review 599-617.

Guangyu Li, ‘Obscure engine: China’s Typical Case system for intellectual property law – empirical and doctrinal insights’

ABSTRACT
This paper integrates empirical and doctrinal approaches to demystify the intellectual property law Typical Case system in China. IP Typical Cases have proliferated nationwide, yet their institutional meaning – particularly what makes them ‘typical’ and what functions they are intended to serve – remains obscure. Normative documents suggest a dual purpose: doctrinally, to unify the application of law across similar cases; and socially, to promote law popularisation and support broader social governance. This dual intention aligns with the findings from a semantic network analysis based on a large-N Weibo dataset, which reveals that IP Typical Cases embody economic, political, and legal dimensions. However, policymakers have overlooked the inherent tension between these functions: the legal function requires the doctrinal complexity of hard cases, whereas the societal function depends on simple, communicable cases suitable for public education. Given the predominance of non-hard cases and the pre-existing ambiguity surrounding the system’s intended purpose, the current IP Typical Case system struggles to realise either objective effectively. A clear recognition of the hard–simple division could enable the system to function more coherently, contributing both to the development of China’s case guidance system and, more narrowly, to the formation of IP legal dogmatics.

Guangyu Li, Obscure engine: China’s Typical Case system for intellectual property law – empirical and doctrinal insights, Legal Studies. Published online by Cambridge University Press: 8 September 2026.

‘Distinguishing the Historical Roots of Goodwill From Trademark Law’s Origins’

Barbara Lauriat, ‘Borrowing Goodwill’, 67 Boston College Law Review 1127 (2026). Trademark law in the United States requires use of a mark in commerce as the basis for both acquisition and infringement of exclusive rights. This requirement is justified, in part, as a way of focusing trademark on its core purpose – protecting the mark owner’s goodwill that arises from such use. Most of the rest of the world relies on the formality of registration as the basis for protection. How did the law in the United States take this nearly-unique evolutionary path? In her extensively-researched article, Professor Barbara Lauriat succeeds in correcting the record about this question by lengthening the relevant historical period to at least the sixteenth century in England and by showing that commercial goodwill had an established recognition in both business practice and in common law as a business’s residual asset distinct from its trademarks … (more)

[Michael W Carroll, JOTWELL, 10 September 2026]

Adam Waldman, ‘Equitable Subrogation to Extinguished Property Interests’

ABSTRACT
This article explores the equitable remedy of subrogation to extinguished property interests. First, it shows that the remedy does not seek to achieve a single purpose, but rather multiple purposes. Each such purpose is only aimed at protecting a claimant from competing interest-holders whose rights already exist at the time of the subrogation-justifying facts. Building upon that, the article demonstrates that a subrogation claimant obtains a new equitable interest, rather than the actual extinguished interest to which the claimant is subrogated. That new equitable interest has only some of the characteristics of the extinguished interest. Finally, the article explores the consequences of this for how the remedy works in the context of statute, whether a claimant can be subrogated to a property interest that is not completely extinguished, and whether a claimant’s interest is a full equitable interest or a mere equity.

Adam Waldman, Equitable Subrogation To Extinguished Property Interests (2026) 50(1) Melbourne University Law Review 145.

Lagioia, Jabłonowska, Liepina and Drazewski, ‘AI in Search of Unfairness in Consumer Contracts: The Terms of Service Landscape’

ABSTRACT
This article explores the potential of artificial intelligence for identifying cases where digital vendors fail to comply with legal obligations, an endeavour that can generate insights about business practices. While heated regulatory debates about online platforms and AI are currently ongoing, we can look to existing horizontal norms, especially concerning the fairness of standard terms, which can serve as a benchmark against which to assess business-to-consumer practices in light of European Union law. We argue that such an assessment can to a certain extent be automated; we thus present an AI system for the automatic detection of unfair terms in business-to-consumer contracts, a system developed as part of the CLAUDETTE project. On the basis of the dataset prepared in this project, we lay out the landscape of contract terms used in different digital consumer markets and theorize their categories, with a focus on five categories of clauses concerning (i) the limitation of liability, (ii) unilateral changes to the contract and/or service, (iii) unilateral termination of the contract, (iv) content removal, and (v) arbitration. In so doing, the paper provides empirical support for the broader claim that AI systems for the automated analysis of textual documents can offer valuable insights into the practices of online vendors and can also provide valuable help in their legal qualification. We argue that the role of technology in protecting consumers in the digital economy is critical and not sufficiently reflected in EU legislative debates.

F Lagioia, A Jabłonowska, R Liepina and K Drazewski, AI in Search of Unfairness in Consumer Contracts: The Terms of Service Landscape, Journal of Consumer Policy volume 45 pages 481-536 (2022). Published: 18 July 2022.

‘“Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of Contract Design”, by Robert Scott and George Triantis’

Economists and lawyers know that almost every contract is incomplete. Contracts routinely omit or leave undefined important terms, and they rarely anticipate every circumstance that might frustrate performance. The reason is simple: It makes little sense to spend $1,000 drafting a provision that has an expected value of only $100. Parties therefore leave lower-value contingencies unaddressed. Yet economists who analyze contracts have focused on a related but distinct issue: the many events for which one might want to account in a contract which cannot be verified by external authorities (eg, courts). If performance terms cannot be verified, it would appear meaningless to include them in a contract … (more)

[Henry A Thompson, Truth on the Market, 10 September 2026]

Rachel Leow, ‘Express Trusts and Public Policy’

ABSTRACT
In recent years, much attention has focused on the use and abuse of express trusts. Two sets of situations have generated the most controversy. The first concerns so-called massively discretionary trusts, where trustees are given very wide dispositive powers, including powers of appointment, but also powers to add or exclude persons as potential objects of the trust. The second concern express trusts set up by settlors who retain substantial control over the trust after its creation, whether as trustees, beneficiaries, protectors, settlors, or some combination of these. Various doctrines have been considered by courts and scholars as ways of invalidating these trusts or aspects of their operation, including shams, illusory trusts, the proper purposes doctrine, and prohibitions against transactions defrauding creditors.

Building of this topical area which has generated wide scholarly and judicial interest, this chapter asks: to what extent can express trusts be invalidated by public policy, with particular focus on these doctrines? I take ‘public policy’ here to refer to considerations that do not concern the interpersonal justice between claimant or defendant, as expressed by their rights, duties, powers, and liabilities.

The central claim of the chapter is that there are very few instances where express trusts can be invalidated by public policy. Furthermore, such instances are likely to be even rarer today, as drafting practices have evolved. Few exceptions remain, neither of which are specific to the law of trusts but apply more broadly. Instead, properly understood, most recent legal developments have sought to clarify what, conceptually, a trust is. Provided that what the settlor has sought to create falls within the law’s conceptual understanding of a trust, courts rarely interfere. This, however, means that the common law has limited tools to address problematic uses of express trusts.

Leow, Rachel, Express Trusts and Public Policy (September 9, 2026). Forthcoming in Zhong Xing Tan, Cheng-Han Tan, and Ying Liew (eds), Commercial Law and Policy (Hart Publishing 2027).

Rita Matulionyte, ‘AI and Copyright Collective Licensing: Australia as a Case Study’

ABSTRACT
As demands for compensation for the use of creative content in AI development intensify, policymakers are considering copyright-based mechanisms, particularly compulsory licensing and extended collective licensing (ECL). Using Australia as a case study and drawing on 22 interviews with stakeholders, this article examines whether these mechanisms can facilitate copyright licensing for AI development purposes while ensuring equitable remuneration for a variety of right holders. It argues that neither of collective licensing models alone offers an optimal solution. Although compulsory licensing could reduce transaction costs by providing AI developers with access to large repertoires through collective management organisations, it may disproportionately constrain exclusive rights and discourage emerging direct licensing markets. ECL is less intrusive but may prove of little benefit if major right holders opt out. In addition, both mechanisms face significant limitations arising from the territorial nature of copyright law and the national treatment principle which might lead to significant share of remuneration ending up with foreign right holders, rather than local ones. The article proposes three principles for future reform: consideration of compensation at AI deployment, rather than development, stage; ensuring that remuneration collected from local AI companies reach local right holders; and ensuring that original creators and not only secondary right holders, receive a fair share of remuneration.

Matulionyte, Rita, AI and Copyright Collective Licensing: Australia as a Case Study (September 4, 2026).