Michael Duff, ‘Reverberations of Magna Carta: Work Injuries, Inkblots, and Restitution’

ABSTRACT
This article argues that workers in the United States have been unconstitutionally undercompensated for their work injuries for at least a century. This provocative fact, coupled with statistics showing that over 120,000 people per year die from workplace injury and occupational disease, suggests a looming post-pandemic struggle for better injury remedies and safer workplaces. Workers’ compensation, the current state-based system by which American workers receive compensation for work-related injury and death, was obtained from legislatures as a ‘Grand Bargain’, the value of which has significantly deteriorated over time; and the constitutional coherence of which has been impacted by the obvious inadequacy of worker remedies. The bargain, in other words, has been breached; and the article argues for a ‘New Bargain’ driven by worker consciousness of employer unjust enrichment from the original bad bargain.

A New Bargain may be contractually renegotiated by labor unions in unionized industries; or it may emerge as a series of ‘shock absorbers’ in reaction to national emergencies, like pandemics and extreme weather events; or expanded disease coverage, which COVID-19 revealed is virtually nonexistent. The New Bargain should be aggressively sought in brusque disregard of the fiction that workplace harm is necessarily accidental and thus damnum absque injuria. This tale was built on misinterpretations of the constitution that simply will no longer do. The article discusses ‘unenumerated rights’ and contends that they exist and include federal guarantees to adequate remedies for tortious harm. More importantly, the article asserts that worker embrace of this idea can energize a spirit of restitution: what has been taken may be regained through mandatory federal bargaining and state-specific statutes.

The article takes issue with inadequate benefits like, for example, arbitrary cutoffs in which workers receive paltry sums like $155,000 (total) for a lifetime of total disability (the maximum recovery in Kansas as of this writing). Given such shocking numbers, it can only be hoped that ‘welfare’ or ‘social security’ will fend off worker poverty. Although partially disabled workers were originally, in the early 20th century, entitled to a weekly benefit based on a percentage of the amount of wages lost as a result of a work injury, or on some estimate of the reduction of an injured worker’s earning capacity after the injury, for the full duration of the injury, this right is no longer recognized in most states. Instead, partially disabled workers are compensated under arbitrary benefit ‘schedules’ bearing no articulated relationship to wages lost, or even to an explicit projected loss of earning capacity. All of this, the article contends, is broadly subject to worker revision, and this article provides an outline of first steps out of the morass.

Duff, Michael C, Reverberations of Magna Carta: Work Injuries, Inkblots, and Restitution (August 16, 2024).

Jeong-Yoo Kim, ‘Seller Liability versus Platform Liability: Optimal Liability Rule and Law Enforcement in the Platform Economy’

ABSTRACT
In this paper, we examine whether the platform as well as the sellers violating the intellectual property right (IPR) should be liable. We first show that platform liability is socially better if the number of potential victims is very large. This is mainly due to the general enforcement effect of the platform’s monitoring activity. In the case of specific enforcement in which each patent or trademark holder selling legitimate products tries to detect only the IP violations of its own brand, the monitoring activity of each seller has no spill-over effect, so that the deterrence effect of its monitoring activity remains the same regardless of the number of patent holders. However, in the case of general enforcement in which the platform monitors the possibility of any IP infringement including all legitimate products on the platform, the deterrence effect of its monitoring activity exceeds the monitoring cost if the number of patent holders is large. Then, in a simple model of two sellers without general enforcement effect, we show that under seller liability, awarding punitive damages with punitive multiplier.

Kim, Jeong-Yoo, Seller Liability versus Platform Liability: Optimal Liability Rule and Law Enforcement in the Platform Economy (August 1, 2024).

Alexander Boni-Saenz, ‘The Right to Fail’

ABSTRACT
This Article explores the conceptual and legal dimensions of the right to fail, particularly the role of support in its conceptualization and operationalization. The right to fail is the entitlement to make choices about one’s own life, even when there is some nontrivial chance of negative consequences. The most natural normative foundation for it is human dignity, as the right to fail is derived from the principle of dignity of risk, though there are additional normative arguments for it that sound more in the values of autonomy or utility. The right to fail is important in disability rights scholarship and politics, as people with disabilities are often deprived of decision-making authority in various contexts. The Article’s descriptive claim is that both choice and consequence in decision-making are more interdependent in nature than the traditional individualistic framing of the right to fail might suggest. The normative claim is that we should promote the adequacy and legal recognition of support networks in order to vindicate the right to fail, particularly but not exclusively for the population of people with cognitive impairments.

Boni-Saenz, Alexander Antonio, The Right to Fail (September 12, 2024), 77 Oklahoma Law Review 11 (2024); Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No 24-39.

Jodi Gardner, ‘Rethinking Risk-Taking: The Death of Volenti?’

ABSTRACT
Volenti non fit injuria allows a negligent defendant to escape liability by showing that the claimant voluntarily and willingly accepted the risk in question. This article combines the theoretical limitations of the volenti defence with a case analysis of how its application has played out in the ‘real world’, and argues it is not fit for modern tort law. The defence has a controversial and chequered history, being described as a ‘so-called principle … of little help: indeed, it is confusing, unnecessary, and if we are not careful, it will lead us to the wrong outcome’. It is submitted that volenti is based on unjustified concepts of people agreeing to risks, leads to harmful outcomes and that the defence does not fit with current approaches to tort liability. This article therefore concludes that the harmful outcomes of the volenti defence far exceed any potential benefits provided, and the defence should therefore be abolished.

Gardner, Jodi, Rethinking Risk-Taking: The Death of Volenti? (May 1, 2022), University of Auckland Faculty of Law Research Paper Series (forthcoming).

Glick, Lozada and Bush, ‘Law and Economics Fallacies: What Modern Economics Really Says About the Definition of Efficiency and the Measurement of Welfare’

ABSTRACT
The fundamental originating principle of law and economics (‘L&E’) is that legal decisions should be (and are) based on maximizing efficiency. But L&E proponents do not define ‘efficiency’ as Pareto Efficiency – the way agreed to by most economists. A Pareto optimal condition is obtained when no one can be made better off without making someone worse off. Pareto Improvements are win-win changes where no losers exist. In the judicial system, however, there are always winners and losers, because under Article III § 2 of the Constitution a legal case does not exist unless there is a justiciable ‘case or controversy’ in need of resolution. Unable to use Pareto Efficiency, L&E scholars have been forced to adopt alternative definitions of efficiency. Most L&E scholars claim to define ‘efficiency’ based on the work of Kaldor and Hicks, but (perhaps unwittingly) instead use a definition of ‘efficiency’ derived from the 19th century idea of consumer surplus, which encompasses L&E notions such as ‘wealth maximization’, and ‘consumer welfare’ in antitrust. Neither of these alternative definitions is viable, however. Outside of L&E, the Kaldor-Hicks approach has long been recognized to be riddled with logical inconsistencies and ethical failures, and the surplus approach is even more deficient. Remarkably, virtually none of the numerous L&E textbooks even hint at such problems. Critically, all definitions of efficiency improvements in L&E are biased in favor of wealthy individuals or firms, because they are dependent on the status quo ante distribution of assets. Many L&E practitioners treat efficiency improvements instead as being objectively good, an error revealing that L&E is primarily motivated by its neoliberal policy agenda. This article makes three contributions to the L&E literature: (1) it explains that the Kaldor Test is different from the Hicks Test, and explains that this difference generates serious obstacles to using the ‘Potential Pareto’ approach to identify good public policy; (2) it shows that antitrust generally does not actually use the Kaldor-Hicks approaches, but rather the older approach of Alfred Marshall’s consumer surplus, and shows what is problematic about that approach; and (3) it shows that most L&E textbooks discuss none of the many problems of making social decisions using ‘Potential Pareto’ or consumer surplus criteria, evasion made possible by teaching the criteria in superficial ways.

Glick, Mark A and Lozada, Gabriel and Bush, Darren, Law and Economics Fallacies: What Modern Economics Really Says About the Definition of Efficiency and the Measurement of Welfare (August 11, 2024).

Jasper Verstappen, ‘Regulating Unfair Commercial Practices in a Smart Contract Context’

ABSTRACT
Emerging technologies can have an impact on legal frameworks that protect consumers. This article investigates the impact of smart contract technology on the European rules regarding unfair commercial practices. It analyses the manner in which legislatures can respond to such new technologies and the impact these technologies can have on the principles of functional equivalency and technological neutrality that underpin legislative efforts. This article suggests that the potential effects of smart contract technology is such that their distinct nature must be taken into account when devising a legislative strategy aimed at modernising the law in order to ensure that the interests of consumers remain protected. It provides recommendations with regard to the manner in which the law can be designed in light of this goal and ensure that, firstly, the law is created in such a way that it can operate more consistently with governance through software and code whilst at the same time ensuring that legal enforcement is admissible in an environment governed by this technology.

Jasper Verstappen, Regulating Unfair Commercial Practices in a Smart Contract Context, European Journal of Law and Technology, volume 15 no 2 (2024). Published 14 September 2024.

Monica Vessio and others, ‘InPerpetuity (Challenging Misperceptions of the Term “Smart Contract”)’

ABSTRACT
In law, the term ‘smart contract’ has been used loosely with no one definition winning out. In an attempt to ameliorate this, the Law Commission of England and Wales has endeavoured to add the word ‘legal’ to ‘smart contract’. No relief is found in the computer coding world, where ‘smart contract’ is used to indicate not a single but several forms of computer codes that do not involve (necessarily) two parties. Through a sample smart contract use case, this paper identifies more than six such coding concepts and constructs which have been corroborated by the results of trend data analysis. Turning to the public, statistics gathered show a very limited understanding of the terms ‘smart contract’ and ‘smart legal contract’ (and their implications). From these findings, this paper recognises the inappropriateness of the use of the single term ‘smart contract’ for the many diverse iterations as used by computer scientists; and the unsuitability of the word ‘contract’ as part of the term ‘smart contract’ by computer scientists because of the term’s legal import. The redundancy of the term ‘smart legal contract’ is established, and in conclusion a definition of ‘smart contract’ which only considers universal, future-proof characteristics is proposed. In this we disagree with the definitions offered by the Law Commission. The definition we have proffered actively contemplates the legacy use of the term in both law and technology, and is broad enough to be sector- and future-adaptable, and technology-agnostic.

Monica Vessio, Arnold Beckmann, Matt Roach, Severine Saintier, Rhys Clements and Anton Setzer, InPerpetuity (Challenging Misperceptions of the Term ‘Smart Contract’), European Journal of Law and Technology, volume 15 no 2 (2024). Published 14 September 2024.

Lupica and Neumann, ‘Thwarting the Inevitability of Over-Indebtedness’

ABSTRACT
Structural inequalities in the United States have led to millions of Americans struggling to pay their bills each month. A single emergency – a sick child, an unexpected car tow, or a reduction in hours at work – can force a low-income household to the brink of financial disaster, risking eviction and overindebtedness.

Such inequalities can be traced to a range of historical, economic, legal, and socio-political factors. Meaningful reform efforts are hampered by the power and influence of special interest groups. The adequacy of even limited government assistance is thwarted by a poverty of thinking about effective and efficient system development. The public-benefits infrastructure does not provide what is required by those in need, instead: processes are complex, application instructions are confusing, eligibility requirements are convoluted, and waits are long. Moreover, these programs have no institutionalized mechanisms or fiscal incentive structure to coordinate among themselves. These programs are siloed and have a single-problem focus, which leads to fragmented responses and truncated interventions that fail to recognize and address the interconnectedness of the myriad issues that thwart self-sufficiency and financial stability. The stories and perspectives of the benefit recipients – all of whom lack political and economic power – fail to be credited.

This Article focuses on how the law’s relationship with economic and political systems has dire effects upon communities at the local level. By challenging the ineffectiveness of these existing systems, this Article spotlights the stark inequalities in our society. This Article further recognizes the bankruptcy system’s limitation as a remedy for debt relief and observes that bankruptcy is not a substitute for effective policies and programs that help the poor navigate financial crises.

Lupica, Lois and Neumann, Zach, Thwarting the Inevitability of Over-Indebtedness (October 30, 2023).

Phillip Magness, ‘The Problems with Piketty’s Data’

ABSTRACT
The Law and Political Economy (LPE) movement frames itself as a legal retort to a ‘crisis’ of rising inequality in the United States, and calls for corrective policy interventions through novel and heavily progressive forms of taxation. These proposals, in turn, are based upon the empirical claims of economist Thomas Piketty. I show that Piketty’s measurements tend to exaggerate the rise of inequality from the 1980s to the present due to uncorrected errors and dubious assumptions in his data construction. The LPE literature, in turn, has neglected to account for the many problems in Piketty’s data when enlisting it for prescriptive political ends.

Magness, Phillip, The Problems with Piketty’s Data (August 13, 2024).

Sandra Wachter, ‘Limitations and Loopholes in the EU AI Act and AI Liability Directives: What This Means for the European Union, the United States, and Beyond’

ABSTRACT
Predictive and generative artificial intelligence (AI) have both become integral parts of our lives through their use in making highly impactful decisions. AI systems are already deployed widely – for example, in employment, healthcare, insurance, finance, education, public administration, and criminal justice. Yet severe ethical issues, such as bias and discrimination, privacy invasiveness, opaqueness, and environmental costs of these systems, are well known. Generative AI (GAI) creates hallucinations and inaccurate or harmful information, which can lead to misinformation, disinformation, and the erosion of scientific knowledge. The Artificial Intelligence Act (AIA), Product Liability Directive, and the Artificial Intelligence Liability Directive reflect Europe’s attempt to curb some of these issues. With the legal reach of these policies going far beyond Europe, their impact on the United States and the rest of the world cannot be overstated. In this Essay, I show how the strong lobbying efforts of big tech companies and member states were unfortunately able to water down much of the AIA. An overreliance on self-regulation, self-certification, weak oversight and investigatory mechanisms, and far-reaching exceptions for both the public and private sectors are the product of this lobbying. Next, I reveal the similar enforcement limitations of the liability frameworks, which focus on material harm while ignoring harm that is immaterial, monetary, and societal, such as bias, hallucinations, and financial losses due to faulty AI products. Lastly, I explore how these loopholes can be closed to create a framework that effectively guards against novel risks caused by AI in the European Union, the United States, and beyond.

Wachter, Sandra, Limitations and Loopholes in the EU AI Act and AI Liability Directives: What This Means for the European Union, the United States, and Beyond (July 1, 2024), Yale Journal of Law & Technology, volume 26, issue 3.