Category Archives: Interpretation
Brian Slocum, ‘Ordinary Meaning: A Theory of the Most Fundamental Principle of Legal Interpretation’
Abstract: Consider this court case: a defendant has traded a gun for drugs, and there is a criminal sentencing provision that stipulates an enhanced punishment if the defendant ‘uses’ a firearm ‘during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime’. Buying the drugs was obviously a crime — but can it be said that the […]
Lee and Mouritsen, ‘Judging Ordinary Meaning’
Abstract: Judges generally begin their interpretive task by looking for the ordinary meaning of the language of the law. And they often end there – out of respect for the notice function of the law or deference to the presumed intent of the lawmaker. Most everyone agrees on the primacy of the ordinary meaning rule. […]
Carney and Bergh, ‘Using Prototype Theory to Determine the Ordinary Meaning of Words’
Abstract: There are a number of ways to determine the ordinary meaning of words, amongst others corpus linguistic and frame semantic approaches – which are not discussed in this note. For the purpose of this note we would like to introduce legal scholars and practitioners to prototype theory, which is possibly one of the best […]
Mark Greenberg, ‘What Makes a Method of Legal Interpretation Correct? Legal Standards vs. Fundamental Determinants’
Abstract: William Baude and Stephen Sachs argue for the importance of the ‘law of interpretation’ – legal standards that govern how statutes, constitutional provisions, and other legal materials are to be interpreted. Their article begins by following and developing a cluster of arguments I have elaborated in recent work – arguments that emphasize the importance […]
Adam Samaha, ‘Do More Interpretive Sources Mean More Discretion?’
Abstract: Observers have suggested that adding sources of interpretation tends to increase interpreter discretion. The idea is embedded in a quip, attributed to Judge Leventhal, that citing legislative history is like ‘looking over a crowd and picking out your friends’. Participants in debates over interpretive method have applied the same idea to the proliferation of […]
Brian Slocum, ‘Ordinary Meaning: A Theory of the Most Fundamental Principle of Legal Interpretation’
Abstract: Consider this court case: a defendant has traded a gun for drugs, and there is a criminal sentencing provision that stipulates an enhanced punishment if the defendant ‘uses’ a firearm ‘during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime’. Buying the drugs was obviously a crime — but can it be said that the […]