Category Archives: Interpretation
Lauren Simpson, ‘#OrdinaryMeaning: Using Twitter as a Corpus in Statutory Analysis’
Introduction … This Comment advocates the theory that Twitter can be used as a corpus to assist judges in determining the ordinary meaning of language. Part II will give an overview of corpus linguistics and how it helps fill gaps left open by traditional tools of statutory interpretation, such as dictionaries. It will then explain […]
John Ramer, ‘Corpus Linguistics: Misfire or More Ammo for the Ordinary-Meaning Canon?’
Abstract Scholars and judges have heralded corpus linguistics – the study of language through collections of spoken or written texts – as a novel tool for statutory interpretation that will help provide an answer in the occasionally ambiguous search for ‘ordinary meaning’ using dictionaries. In the spring of 2016, the Michigan Supreme Court became the […]
Martin Kelly, ‘Mixed-up Wills, Rectification and Interpretation: Marley v. Rawlings’
Abstract In Marley v Rawlings, the UK Supreme Court had to decide who should inherit the estate of Alfred Rawlings – who had mistakenly signed his wife’s Will (instead of his own). In this article, I will examine the issues of interpretative methodology arising from this case. The Supreme Court resolved the dispute by exercising […]
Gries and Slocum, ‘Ordinary Meaning and Corpus Linguistics’
Abstract This paper demonstrates how corpus analysis, and similar empirically-based methods of language study, can help inform judicial assessments about language meaning. We first briefly outline our view of legal language and interpretation in order to demonstrate the importance of the ordinary meaning doctrine, and thus the relevance of tools such as corpus analysis, to […]
‘Philosophy of Language and Legal Interpretation’
Brian G Slocum, Pragmatics and Legal Texts: How Best to Account for the Gaps between Literal Meaning and Communicative Meaning, in The Pragmatic Turn in Law: Inference and Interpretation in Legal Discourse (Mouton Series of Pragmatics, forthcoming 2017), available at SSRN. Law is pervasively interested in the proper understanding and application of texts: contracts, wills, […]
Andreas Blank, ‘Common usage, presumption and verisimilitude in sixteenth-century theories of juridical interpretation’
Abstract: The question of how common usage could be constitutive for the meaning of linguistic expressions has been discussed by Renaissance philosophers such as Lorenzo Valla, and it also played an important role in Renaissance theories of juridical interpretation. An aspect of the analysis of common usage in Renaissance theories of juridical interpretation that concerns […]
Lee and Mouritsen, ‘Judging Ordinary Meaning’
Abstract: Judges generally begin their interpretive task by looking for the ordinary meaning of the language of the law. And they often end there – out of respect for the notice function of the law or deference to the presumed intent of the lawmaker. Most everyone agrees on the primacy of the ordinary meaning rule. […]
Carney and Bergh, ‘Using Prototype Theory to Determine the Ordinary Meaning of Words’
Abstract: There are a number of ways to determine the ordinary meaning of words, amongst others corpus linguistic and frame semantic approaches – which are not discussed in this note. For the purpose of this note we would like to introduce legal scholars and practitioners to prototype theory, which is possibly one of the best […]
Mark Greenberg, ‘What Makes a Method of Legal Interpretation Correct? Legal Standards vs. Fundamental Determinants’
Abstract: William Baude and Stephen Sachs argue for the importance of the ‘law of interpretation’ – legal standards that govern how statutes, constitutional provisions, and other legal materials are to be interpreted. Their article begins by following and developing a cluster of arguments I have elaborated in recent work – arguments that emphasize the importance […]
Adam Samaha, ‘Do More Interpretive Sources Mean More Discretion?’
Abstract: Observers have suggested that adding sources of interpretation tends to increase interpreter discretion. The idea is embedded in a quip, attributed to Judge Leventhal, that citing legislative history is like ‘looking over a crowd and picking out your friends’. Participants in debates over interpretive method have applied the same idea to the proliferation of […]