Category Archives: General
Minju Kang, ‘A Social Law Approach to Business and Human Rights’
ABSTRACT This thesis proposes a social law approach to examine and suggest future directions for the legal and institutional responses to the Business and Human Rights (BHR) framework. The social law approach referred to in this thesis seeks to interpret and apply social law’s inherent ethos and methodologies to the current global value chain economy […]
‘Realism or Formalism or Both?’
Andrew S Gold and Thilo Kuntz, ‘Bridges Between Realism and Formalism’, 70 American Journal of Jurisprudence 121 (2025). In their essay, ‘Bridges Between Realism and Formalism’, introducing a special symposium issue of the American Journal of Jurisprudence, Andrew Gold and Thilo Kuntz provide a clear and helpful survey of the impressive array of contributions, with […]
Mendelsohn and Hantel, ‘Commutative Justice as Fairness in the Digital Economy – A Private Law Interpretation of Fairness in EU Digital Acts’
ABSTRACT A number of new European Union (EU) law acts dealing with the digital economy reference fairness as one of their main goals or benchmarks, which has sparked renewed interest in the normative meaning of fairness and the role it plays in the regulation of the digital market. This paper draws on a private law […]
Simon Landuyt, ‘The Pari Passu (and Other) Puzzle(s): Towards A More General Theory of (Business) Risk Allocation’
ABSTRACT In a ‘perfect’ world, all types of legal mechanisms which displace the equality of creditors in a concurrence (samenloop) – such as statutory privileges (voorrechten) and security rights – would be pointless. After all, parties who cannot enjoy a priority (whether de jure or de facto) will raise their ex ante ‘price’ for contracting […]
Neil Duxbury, ‘The General Law Renaissance and the Common Law’
ABSTRACT Of late, there has emerged an important body of legal scholarship sympathetically reassessing the concept of ‘general law’ – unwritten legal norms discoverable by courts. This article shows that these reassessments run up against a problem when the general law in question is common law. The problem arises from a question: what makes common […]
Simon Stern, ‘The Reasonable Person as a Narrative Device’
ABSTRACT One question about the ‘reasonable person’ standard, rarely asked by legal theorists and historians, is why the standard is personified and how a personification lands differently from an abstract version. I have begun to explore that question in other work and turn here to the question of how the personification first emerged, around the […]
Mingdong He, ‘The Responsibility Anchor – Why AI Law Needs a Bearer before it needs a Person’
ABSTRACT The Article’s starting point is a structural omission in the literature on AI responsibility. The three standard answers to the question of AI wrongdoing — the responsibility-gap literature (who is responsible when human control is too thin for blame to attach?), the legal-personhood debate (should an AI system be granted legal personality?), and the […]
‘What AI Chatbots Can Teach Us About Unmet Legal Needs’
Despite growing public discussion about its potential role in the justice system, we still know remarkably little about how ordinary people are already using generally available tools like ChatGPT when they encounter legal problems. In turn, we are overlooking what those interactions can tell us about our justice system itself. To understand this shift, researchers […]
Jay Feinman, ‘The Purposes of Insurance Law Revisited’
ABSTRACT This paper was presented at a symposium celebrating the illustrious career of Professor Kenneth S Abraham, using as a marker the fortieth anniversary of the publication of his book, Distributing Risk: Insurance, Legal Theory, and Public Policy. The book was a landmark in the study of insurance and insurance law in the United States. […]
Debadatta Bose, ‘Postcolonial Private Law’
ABSTRACT This Article provides the missing normative foundation by linking dynamic due process and rigorous rational basis to deliberative democracy. Rigorous rational basis, in essence, requires that majorities offer what deliberative democracy calls publicly accessible reasons – those capable of engaging fellow citizens across lines of difference – for restrictions on liberties. Courts, from this […]