ABSTRACT
This Essay begins with the assertion that sex should be thought of as a domain of private law and proceeds to analyze it as such through a juxtaposition with the more securely private law domain of contracts. Part I examines and critiques the existing models of sexual consent and feminist proposals for consent reform, particularly those that take private law mechanisms – such as tort – as their basis. Part II considers the structural similarities and distinctions between consent as it functions in sex and in contracts, and considers how consent is always extracted against background conditions of coercion. Working with the ideas of Robert Hale, Gillian Hadfield, and John Dewey, Part III offers a value pluralist solution, arguing that the validity of consent should be evaluated by evaluation of the conditions under which that consent was reached-namely, whether the consenting party had ‘relative deliberative freedom’ in their decision to consent.
Pal, Sohum, Consent And Coercion, In Sex And In Contracts (September 29, 2026).
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