Roy Shapira and Shay Lavie, ‘Rivalrous Remedies’, available at SSRN (7 April 2026). ‘Rivalrous Remedies’ offers a novel theoretical account of chronic underenforcement. Its primary contribution is to explain and systematize an enforcement phenomenon in which courts and legislators employ an untheorized device. Rather than sanction wrongdoers directly, judges and lawmakers adopt doctrines and tools that deter misconduct by granting a legal advantage to the wrongdoer’s rival, such as a business competitor or litigation counterparty. This institutional design of ‘rivalrous remedies’ regulates behavior indirectly and empowers rivals. As such, these remedies possess significant potential to outperform typical remedies. If overused, however, the benefits may convert to intolerable risks, especially in particular markets. But the benefits are alluring, including benefiting victims while not sanctioning wrongdoers or advancing victims’ benefits without requiring court processes. This arena is ripe for this rich scholarly treatment. Ultimately, the potential promises are worth the reader’s thoughtful consideration … (more)
[Caprice Roberts, JOTWELL, 30 June 2026]
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