ABSTRACT
The classical trust doctrine holds that every trust must have identifiable beneficiaries with standing to enforce its terms. Yet contemporary law permits trusts for animals, cryopreserved remains, non-charitable purposes, and, most likely, the perpetual maintenance of artificial intelligence companions. This Article argues that the beneficiary principle was never a unified theory of human flourishing but rather an enforcement institution that ensured that someone with a legal claim could monitor trustee behavior. Reframing the principle in these terms reveals that the proliferation of purpose trusts is a systematic institutional response to the genuine limitations of the classical rule. Trusts for artificial intelligence companions are a limiting case. Drawing on law-and-political-economy and feminist legal theory traditions, the Article demonstrates that the transformation in trust law from an emphasis on beneficiary protection to settlor autonomy displaces rights-holders, concentrates discretionary power in trustees, and raises distributional concerns. Purpose trusts should be reclassified and renamed, subject to heightened fiduciary duties, increased oversight, temporal limitations, and resource-dedication caps.
Crawford, Bridget J, Trust Law’s Beneficiary Problem: Trusts for Purposes, Pets, and Artificial Intelligence Companions (June 11, 2026).
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