ABSTRACT
In this article, I argue that a reconstructive theory of private law, such as that of Dagan and Dorfman’s, ought to more explicitly engage with the process of reconstruction itself. I try to anticipate such a path of inquiry by questioning ‘what’, ‘who’ and ‘how’ is being reconstructed in their relational justice theory of private law. First, I query how the authors construct the object of study, the ‘what’ of private law, which I suggest needs to be (re)constructed both in relation to time and change (Section II). Second, I challenge the authors to take the question of ‘who’ in private law relations more seriously, given that private legal relations are often relations between humans and not so very human participants in private legal relations, that is corporations (Section III). Finally, I ask ‘how’ Dagan and Dorfman construct relationality itself in their account. The focus on poverty, I argue, is a tricky turn, since it neither furthers equal respect (are both sides really treated with equal respect?) nor reform (what is taken for granted here?).
Marija Bartl, Between ‘Is’ and ‘Ought’: Realizing Relational Justice in Private Law, Law and Philosophy. Published: 4 June 2026.
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