ABSTRACT
This paper develops a framework for understanding wrongs and related concepts by distinguishing three normative perspectives – moral, political, and legal – and analyzing the kinds of reasons that structure each. From the moral perspective, it treats wrongs as breaches of duty on a broadly Razian account, clarifies differences between prima facie, pro tanto, and all‑things‑considered wrongs, as well as those between strict and fault‑incorporating wrongs, distinguishes wrongs from moral mistakes, and examines the normative force of rational remainders. From the political perspective, it shifts attention to practices of responding to (actual or supposed) wrongs – calling to account, blaming, and punishing – understood as second‑personal accountability, and distinguishes private wrongs from public wrongs. From the legal perspective, it identifies crimes (criminal legal wrongs) as comprehensive public wrongs, and explains the normative salience of criminal law’s offense/defense structure. The aim of the paper is to clarify the conceptual landscape in which wrongs and wrong-making responses exist, while highlighting the potential of those responses to realize important values and perhaps to reconstitute the character of our political communities.
Dempsey, Michelle Madden, Wrongs (and Related Concepts) in Moral, Political, and Legal Perspectives (May 1, 2026).
Leave a Reply