ABSTRACT
In an earlier article, we argued that post-mortem privacy is not sufficiently protected in England and Wales. In this article, we draw from Boonin’s posthumous harm thesis and posthumous wrong thesis to develop a framework and rationale for justifying the recognition and enforcement of a privacy right post-mortem. Essentially, our theoretical framework suggests that, just as a living person can be harmed by an act that does not have any effect on their conscious experience, such as the frustration of their desires, the dead can also suffer unfelt harm. We test and illustrate the analytical and explanatory power of this theoretical framework with a USA post-mortem privacy case and five relevant practical examples. Furthermore, we examine some important cases in England and Wales, and some cases from the ECtHR, to show how the use of our framework could lead to the recognition and justification of a privacy right post-mortem.
Remigius N Nwabueze and Matthew White, Privacy law and the dead – a reappraisal (part II), Journal of Media Law. Published online: 15 April 2026.
See also: Nwabueze and White, ‘Privacy law and the dead – a reappraisal’
Leave a Reply