Private Law Theory

ABSTRACT
Amidst a growing affordability crisis, tenant unions organize to secure individual tenant protections, win collective control of housing, and build political power. Tenant unions harness rent strikes and organize across state lines to force landlords to come to the bargaining table absent any federal, state, or local legislative scheme compelling landlords to do so. This Article is the first in over fifty years to engage with landlord-tenant collective bargaining as it occurs in most jurisdictions, through private law making.

Using a composite case study based on real tenant organizing campaigns, this Article illustrates how tenant unions bargain private contracts by creating crises for landlords. Drawing on that case study, I argue that the limited liability company and the laws shaping the housing market limit the efficacy of building-based collective bargaining. I argue that tenant unions are best able to attain their goals through collective bargaining in properties that are both susceptible to crisis-at risk of default should tenants rent strike or otherwise deny the landlord revenue-and simultaneously capable of sustaining increased costs or lower revenues incorporated into an agreement. This Article argues that real estate law renders landlord-tenant collective bargaining effective in a narrow band of properties in stable and gentrifying housing markets. It argues for diversity of political economy-dependent law and organizing strategies to secure individual tenant protections, win collective control of housing, and build political power.

Baltz, Greg, Landlord-Tenant Collective Bargaining (February 1, 2026), 48 Cardozo Law Review (forthcoming 2026).