ABSTRACT
This article introduces the Paradox of Compensation, a challenge for theories of moral obligation. The central question is how demands for compensation can be legitimate – as they often seem to be – even when the duty-bearer is justified in setting the relevant duty aside. I argue that the moral frameworks developed by R Jay Wallace’s and Stephen Darwall fail to resolve this paradox because they are committed to Rationalism, the view that moral obligations depend on the duty-bearer’s having decisive reason to comply. As a result, these theories struggle to give a coherent account of cases where compensation appears appropriate despite justified noncompliance. To address this difficulty, I propose an Anti-rationalist alternative. On my proposal, compensation can be legitimate in such cases because it reflects the persistence of the deontic relationship between the two poles of a bipolar claim, even when the duty is outweighed. I contend that this explanation is available only if we reject traditional Rationalist models of moral obligation, on which obligations are fully determined by the duty-bearer’s reasons.
Bernat Roca, Moral Rationalism and the Paradox of Compensation, Journal of Value Inquiry (2026). Published: 2 April 2026.
Leave a Reply