ABSTRACT
Objections to harsh criminal sanctions have long been offender centered. This Article demonstrates that harsh sanctions also disadvantage victims. Using rich data from Pennsylvania, and employing prior record as an instrumental variable, we examine the interplay between incarceration length and restitution. Our findings show that longer incarceration periods reduce the likelihood as well as the amount of restitution paid to victims. This result is robust and applies to a host of offense types. Two theories are tested as possible mechanisms: offenders’ ability to pay, and judges’ concerns for proportionality. While ability to pay may partially account for the observed tradeoff, several indicators suggest that judges curb restitution payments to balance harsh sentences prescribed by the legislature. A number of policy implications are discussed, including the social costs of harsh penalties, efficient deterrence, victims’ rights, and the effect of legislative attempts to restrict judicial sentencing discretion.
Guttel, Ehud and Leibovitch, Adi, Sanctions and Restitution (October 29, 2025), American Law and Economics Review (forthcoming).
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