ABSTRACT
The concept of economic inequality driven by the concentration of Intellectual Property (IP) is emerging as a novel framework for understanding economic disparities. This arises from the unique implications of IP on market structure and competitive dynamics. Traditionally, competition law has focused on preventing market power abuses that can arise from monopolies and cartels. However, the concentration of IP rights – mainly through patents – introduces a novel dimension of market control that can exacerbate inequality in ways that competition law is still grappling to understand and address fully.
IP concentration refers to the excessive centralization of IP rights within a limited number of entities, often leading to economic disparities that transcend the typical monopoly scenarios envisaged by classic competition law. This dominance is not solely due to the suppression of competition but also stems from the ability to stifle innovation and maintain high barriers to market entry for new competitors. The novel economic inequality arises because IP concentration can limit access to technological advancements such as essential medicines or genetically modified organisms (GMOs), creating a scenario where the benefits of innovation accrue to a few rather than being dispersed across society.
Drawing from welfare economic policy, the article further acknowledges IP’s limited ability for self-correction in the face of such inequality. To bridge this gap, it presents four policy proposals: transfer policy, distributive justice, case prioritization, and IP enforcement adjustments, each rooted in economic theory and designed to redress the imbalances rooted in IP concentration. These policies intertwine with the tenets of competition law, advocating for an overhaul of the current IP regulatory framework, ensuring that IP fuels innovation while aligning with the broader socio-economic goals of reducing inequality and promoting equitable market practices.
Daniel Benoliel, Intellectual Property Inequality Alleviation, 24 Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property 66 (2025).
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