ABSTRACT
When we seek a fuller understanding of individual liberty including its relational character, we confront a conundrum. The evident advantages of a single individual possessing liberty cannot be simply transferred to a greater number of beneficiaries. This conundrum is confronted with the resources of Hohfeld’s analytical framework, developed specifically to elucidate the practical outworkings of interpersonal relations within the law. Attention is also paid to concerns expressed by von Wright over a representation of liberty (permission) within the resources of standard deontic logic which fails to address its social aspect. The aggregate level of the Hohfeldian scheme is employed to represent a complete picture of liberty, but one that cannot guarantee benefits for a plurality of holders. The conclusion is reached that in order to extend the advantages of individual liberty to all something other than liberty is required.
Halpin, Andrew, Other People’s Liberties (February 27, 2024), (2024) 37 Ratio Juris 2-24.
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