ABSTRACT
Theories of justice, following Aristotle, are usually divided into theories of retributive justice (punishment), corrective justice (the payment of damages for private injuries), and distributive justice (the regulation of social benefits, particularly economic rights and opportunities). This paper is concerned with the second. Its aim is to critically examine and analyze the limit that this theory poses to judges and other policy makers in addressing the harm caused to the individual and the society at large by crime and those who commit them. Injuries caused by crime and other wrongdoings require some kind of redress for the sake of preserving the society and the wellbeing of mankind. Crime is a setback to peace, order, harmony and progress of people and their society and harms relationships between individuals and perpetuates injustice. When one commits a crime against another, he takes undue advantage of the other; causing inequality in their relationship.
According to Aristotle, rectificatory/corrective justice is concerned with restoring this inequality between the parties by penalizing the wrongdoer. But this paper observes that this theory is insufficient and inadequate as it fails to address the problem because, in trying to remedy the damage already done, attention is usually focused on the victim alone, while leaving behind the offender and the community. This paper therefore, attempts to expose this shortcomings, confront this challenge, and provide or suggest an alternative form of restorative, corrective or rectifactory justice that is inclusive of both the victim, offender and their community at large. The paper leverages on the views of Howard Zehr in particular in contending that, in working towards making things right again, all the stake holders must be involved.
Anthony Udoka Ezebuiro and Innocent Anthony Uke, The Moral Limit of Aristotle’s Corrective Justice, Sapientia Journal of Philosophy, volume 19, December 2023.
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