INTRODUCTION
While many believe in the existence of a moral right to privacy, there is no clear-cut agreement in the literature regarding the precise duties engendered by this right. However, most would likely grant the following: The right to privacy sometimes requires of us that we do not engage in certain forms of snooping, since such behavior might lead us to acquire certain beliefs or convictions about others’ private affairs, and it would also require us to keep a secret when others entrust us with one, equally in the interest of ensuring that private affairs remain concealed.
One compelling line that is supposed to explain why the above-mentioned acts would be objectionable on the grounds that they violate a person’s right to privacy is that we have interests in what others think of us – be it non-instrumentally, instrumentally or both. Privacy scholars accepting this rough picture should thereby concede that there is at least one sense in which the right to privacy engenders doxastic duties. In other words, they accept that a moral right to privacy has bearing on how we ought to act as doxastic agents to manage our beliefs …
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Lauritz Aastrup Munch, How Privacy Rights Engender Direct Doxastic Duties, The Journal of Value Inquiry (2021). Published: 4 January 2021.
First posted 2021-01-04 17:51:34
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