ABSTRACT
This Article critiques the debate over the nature of rights on the grounds that theorists have (1) failed to specify and defend an ultimate aim, (2) predominantly deployed a standard of success-extensional fit – that is deeply problematic, and (3) failed to articulate with sufficient specificity or concreteness the notions of having a will and exercising a power that are at the heart of the disagreement. Will Theorists implicitly deploy thick conceptions of those notions but do not defend that choice or grapple with its exclusionary and discriminatory implications for adults. The Article concludes by suggesting that, in light of the likely insurmountable difficulty of the challenges posed, the debate should be abandoned and legal philosophers should stipulate a meaning of ‘right’ that is optimal on normative grounds.
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James G Dwyer, Clarifying questions about the nature of rights, Jurisprudence: An International Journal of Legal and Political Thought, https://doi.org/10.1080/20403313.2020.1836905. Published online: 4 November 2020.
First posted 2020-11-05 07:34:29
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