Category Archives: Interpretation
Harold Anthony Lloyd, ‘How To Do Things With Signs: Semiotics in Legal Theory, Practice, and Education’
ABSTRACT Discussing federal statutes, Justice Scalia tells us that ‘[t]he stark reality is that the only thing that one can say for sure was agreed to by both houses and the president (on signing the bill) is the text of the statute. The rest is legal fiction’. How should we take this claim? If we […]
Evan Zoldan, ‘Corpus Linguistics and the Dream of Objectivity’
ABSTRACT A growing number of scholars and judges have embraced corpus linguistics as a way to interpret legal texts. Their stated goal – to make legal interpretation more objective – is an admirable one. But, is their claim that corpus linguistics reduces the subjectivity associated with judicial intuition and biased data more than just a […]
Mark Greenberg, ‘Legal Interpretation’
ABSTRACT This paper is a long version of my chapter on legal interpretation for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. A shorter and otherwise modified version will go online soon. But some readers may be interested in the full-length version. Legal interpretation involves scrutinizing legal texts such as the texts of statutes, constitutions, contracts, and wills. […]
Mark Greenberg, ‘Beyond Textualism’
ABSTRACT This paper was the basis for my Fordham University Natural Law Colloquium lecture in September 2019. More than 20 years ago, Justice Scalia wrote of ‘the great degree of confusion that prevails’ in the field of statutory interpretation. Today, Scalia’s textualism is ascendant. Over the past three decades, textualism has expanded its influence both […]
Special Issue of Statute Law Review on Adjudication
Special Issue on Adjudication: What Gives Meaning to Statutory Rules and Constitutional Provisions? (Christopher Walshaw) Recent Developments in Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation (Christopher Walshaw) Ordinary Meaning and Empiricism (Brian G Slocum) Law as Narrative: Narrative Interpretation and Appropriation as an Element of Theft (Steven Cammiss) The Principle of Legality and Legislative Intention (Robert French) Legislative […]
Adam Perry, ‘Strained Interpretations’
ABSTRACT Judges often give statutes strained interpretations. What makes an interpretation strained? What, if anything, justifies a strained interpretation? Is there always a point past which an interpretation would be too strained, or are there some interpretations which judges are entitled to adopt, whatever a statute says? I claim to answer all of these questions. […]
Just Published: Statutory Interpretation in Private Law (Prue Vines and M Scott Donald eds)
In the past 50 years private law has undergone a revolution: statutes are now prevalent in every area. This book considers how judges in private law cases should respond to this change. How are statutes to be interpreted in this area with its deep historical roots, and is it reasonable to think that statutory interpretation […]
Amalia Amaya, ‘Virtuous Adjudication; or the Relevance of Judicial Character to Legal Interpretation’
ABSTRACT The main tenet that this article aims to establish is that judicial virtue is necessary for successful legal interpretation. Theories of interpretation are exceedingly useful devices to guide and assess judicial reasoning, but they are limited in that the soundness of their outcomes is dependent upon the possession and exercise of judicial virtue. Thus, […]
‘Legal Theory Lexicon: Corpus Linguistics’
“Law students quickly learn that the interpretation of legal texts is an important component of legal practice. Legal disputes frequently turn on the meaning of a contract, will, rule, regulation, statute, or constitutional provision. How do we determine the meaning of legal texts? One possibility is that judges could consult their linguistic intuitions. Another possibility […]
Krishnakumar and Nourse, ‘The Canon Wars’
Abstract Canons are taking their turn down the academic runway in ways that no one would have foretold just a decade ago. Affection for canons of construction has taken center stage in recent Supreme Court cases and in constitutional theory. Harvard Dean John Manning and originalists Will Baude and Stephen Sachs have all suggested that […]