ABSTRACT
We examine whether legal protection for civic participation affects corporate pollution. Polluters may deter public discipline through strategic lawsuits. Anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) statutes mitigate this threat by enabling prompt dismissal and recovery of legal costs. Using a difference-indifferences design, we find that enacting an anti-SLAPP statute in a state significantly reduces toxic emissions from that state by increasing local public pressure. The reduction is greater when the statutes provide stronger protection, when local stakeholders have stronger incentives and abilities to discipline polluters, and when local public pressure increases more after the enactment. Plants lower emissions by improving abatement rather than by reducing output or relocating emissions. Our paper underscores the role of legal protection in environmental governance and informs policy debates over anti-SLAPP legislation.
Chen, Zhihong and Chen, Kevin CW and Sun, Chengzhu (Lisa), The Anti-SLAPP Statutes and Corporate Environmental Policies (October 8, 2026), Journal of Accounting Research, forthcoming.
Leave a Reply