ABSTRACT
This article diagnoses a structural limit in the concept of the legal subject. It argues that the operations by which law assigns rights, liabilities, standing, and recognition all presuppose a subject that is singular, durable, present, and intelligible. One, that is, which persists as the same countable individual through ordinary time and can be recognised by other subjects as a bearer of legal positions. These four assumptions have never required examination, because no entity the law has governed has violated them. The article shows, through a series of emerging entities drawn from contemporary projections of technologically mediated society, copyable digital persons, agents designed for dissolution, distributed intelligences, and forms of artificial life whose interpretation of value and continuity may be radically non-human — that each assumption can now fail, and that its failure disables a specific and basic legal operation. A genealogy of the legal subject then demonstrates that the four assumptions are contingent constructions rather than conceptual necessities: across two millennia the boundary of legal personhood has been drawn and redrawn for the law’s purposes, cutting across the line between human and non-human in both directions. The diagnosis that follows is not that existing categories need adjustment at their edges but that they fail at their foundation: the strategy of extension by which law has always incorporated new persons cannot reach entities that violate the assumptions on which extension itself depends. The article does not propose a cure. It establishes the problem, and closes by identifying the point at which a differently grounded jurisprudence becomes necessary.
Ammar Younas, The Failing Subject: A Diagnosis of Legal Personhood for a Multi-Entity World, PhilArchive 10 August 2026.
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