Lewis Graham, ‘Interpreting the Interpretive Obligation: Empirical Insights into the Use of Section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (14 March 2026). It is not difficult to think of constitutional rules that are criticized, defended, or often both, on normative grounds that are more or less fact-free – not for what they actually are, but for what their critics or defenders believe they are or ought to be. In the United States, the Citizens United decision comes to mind. In the United Kingdom, Lewis Graham argues, a similar fate has befallen section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (‘HRA’), which provides that ‘[s]o far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the … rights’ protected by the European Convention on Human Rights … (more)
[Leonid Sirota, JOTWELL, 22 May 2026]
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