ABSTRACT
This article challenges the view that Brexit was a vote for a bonfire of core consumer law of European union (EU) origin. It explores evidence that regulatory differences are impacting on United Kingdom (UK) businesses’ trading in the EU; as well as EU businesses’ appetite to trade in the UK. In consumer sales such frictions often manifest in a negative impact for the price sensitivity of consumers. Tackling these frictions is sensitive. This article proposes an innovative solution: an optional instrument. The essential idea of an optional instrument is a dual legal regime, operating alongside national law, which parties can choose to govern a transaction. This would respect the UK’s autonomy in respect of consumer protection law. It would also respect party autonomy and foster consumer confidence by building upon now familiar EU-derived laws. Conversely, it would create competition between two consumer law frameworks, incentivising enhancements, and possibly legal innovation, in, for example, seeking endorsements from consumer groups.
€ (Westlaw)
James Devenney, ‘Brexit, consumer law and legal pluralism: the case for an optional instrument on core consumer law’ [2026] Journal of Business Law (4) 307-328.
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