ABSTRACT
Bribery is among the most corrosive of civil wrongs, yet the common law action for bribery has long resisted principled analysis. The Supreme Court’s landmark recognition of a tort of bribery in Hopcraft v Close Brothers Ltd has brought the cause of action into sharper focus — but the foundations on which it has been constructed are unstable. This article argues that the current approach suffers from both analytical incoherence and an irreconcilable tension with the criminal law, and advances three claims in response.
First, the tort of bribery should be disaggregated into two distinct wrongs: the tort of bribing, committed by the briber, and the tort of bribe-taking, committed by the bribee.
Second, and more fundamentally, liability should turn not on the existence of a fiduciary relationship, but on a fidelity relationship. A fidelity relationship arises where an entrustor vests a function-holder with a defined role, whose performance the entrustor relies upon, and the function-holder is expected to discharge that role in good faith — honestly, with regard to the purposes for which the function is entrusted, and without deliberately subverting it. Unlike fiduciary loyalty, which demands the total subordination of self-interest, fidelity requires only the non-subversion of an entrusted role.
Finally, the article challenges the prevailing remedial analysis, arguing that recovery of the value of a bribe is better understood as compensation for the injuria caused by the subversion of a protected legal facility, rather than as restitution for wrongs.
Tan, Weiming, Civil Liability for Bribery, Reanalysed (May 10, 2026).
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