ABSTRACT
This article examines the doctrine of consideration in the common law of contracts and attempts to identify a new and plausible justification for several features and implications of this doctrine. The first main conclusion is that the coherence of contract duties is facilitated by the enforceability of sealed promises, but only where the validity of executed gifts does not require consideration. The second conclusion is that any contract duty established by exercising power-conferring rules ought to be enforceable only if not subject to the promisor’s change of mind regarding such exercise. This implies that purely gratuitous promises, which are subject to such change of mind, ought to be unenforceable. The third conclusion is that the doctrine of consideration is prima facie justified because it ensures that contract duties established at formation are authoritative according to Joseph Raz’s service conception of authority.
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Rob Tokawa, Justifying Contract: Coherence, Changes of Mind, and the Authority of Consideration, Ratio Juris. First published: 3 November 2025.
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