ABSTRACT
In this paper, I argue against a widely held view about interpersonal moral relations inspired by Benjamin Cardozo’s landmark judgment in Palsgraf v Long Island Railroad Company, which I call the Relational Fault Requirement. The requirement holds that in order for A to commit a directed wrong against B, A must be at fault in relation to B. I present two ways of understanding wrongs that violate this requirement: (1) that one is wronged if one is harmed by a wrongful action, and (2) that one is wronged if one is harmed by a wrongful action and the outcome one suffers is sufficiently similar to the grounds on which the action is wrong. Accepting either of these ideas requires rejecting the Relational Fault Requirement and encourages us to rethink the core elements of directed wrongdoing.
Adam Slavny, Relational Fault and Unforeseeable Victims, Legal Theory. Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 March 2025.
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