ABSTRACT
I construct a three-stage simultaneous move game to evaluate the impact of having the option of signing a prenuptial agreement on domestic violence. In my framework, partners like exerting violence but dislike being subjected to violence by their partners. I find that the extent of violence chosen by partners under a state division rule (used in an absence of a prenup) is high, regardless of whether they file for divorce or not. I derive conditions under which a prenup reduces domestic violence. Having a prenup option does not necessarily reduce violence if the cost of filing for divorce is high or if the cost of violence borne by the accused at the time of divorce is low. My work suggests that reducing the cost of filing for divorce and the cost of signing prenups, (including stigma as well as monetary costs) may reduce domestic violence.
Malhotra, Shreya, Does the Option to Sign Prenuptial Agreements affect Domestic Violence? (May 5, 2021).
First posted 2022-07-25 16:00:28
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