ABSTRACT
Algorithms may seriously impair the right to privacy held by groups of individuals (and thus, more subtly, individuals themselves, but relationally). Indeed, a functional equivalence exists between the way personal data is gathered and aggregated, and the patterns of data analysis about groups of individuals, with the difference that whilst the first is (unevenly) regulated domestically, EU-wide, as well as internationally, the second is almost consistently disregarded. Consequently, one needs to determine whether a full-standing ‘right to group privacy’ should be recognised also as a legal (alternatively to only moral) obligation. In the positive, policymakers shall establish the (expectedly sophisticated) criteria for deciding what groups would not be simply considered as ‘aggregated bundles of individual privacy rights’ (defined here as ‘collective rights’, like in a standard ‘class action’) by algorithms’ owners, programmers, and end-users. The main contribution of the present study is to further the theoretical understanding of the relevance of mentioned distinction (collective vs group rights) by drawing normative inferences from the modern-day psychology theory of Gestalt, eventually encoding a wider range of legal shades, and possible implications thereof for privacy entitlements in everyday life.
Vecellio Segate, Riccardo, Shifting Privacy Rights from the Individual to the Group: A Re-Adaptation of Algorithms Regulation to Address the Gestaltian Configuration of Groups (May 25, 2022). Loyola University Chicago Journal of Regulatory Compliance, 8(1), pp 55-114 (2022).
First posted 2022-06-09 12:00:36
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