Private Law Theory

Abstract
In their provocative essay, Interpersonal Human Rights, Dagan and Dorfman argue that when private parties from different national jurisdictions interact, their interaction is properly subject to a distinctive regime of private law they call jus gentium privatum. In this comment, I draw attention to two dimensions of the Dagan/Dorfman project. The first is internal, and involves an examination of Dagan and Dorfman’s basic argument from privity in favor of the jus gentium privatum. I suggest there is tension between their use of a formal concept of privity, on the one hand, and their theory of private law, on the other. The second dimension I explore pertains to characterization, and interrogates Dagan and Dorfman’s description of the jus gentium privatum as a regime of interpersonal human rights. I ask after what Dagan and Dorfman mean here by ‘interpersonal’, since the human rights duty-bearer of international law – the state – is a person, too.

Fox-Decent, Evan, Dagan and Dorfman’s Jus Gentium Privatum (October 14, 2018). Cornell International Law Journal Online, volume 51, 2018.

First posted 2018-12-22 08:42:43