ABSTRACT
The decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Rubis Bahamas Ltd v Russell is the most significant development in the law of Rylands v Fletcher for decades. Rejecting the view that the rule is merely a sub-species of private nuisance, the Committee reconstructed it as an independent rule of strict liability governing harm caused by exceptionally dangerous things. This note argues that the recharacterisation is largely welcome. It restores coherence to the relationship between Rylands v Fletcher, nuisance and negligence, and supports the actionability of personal injury. At the same time, the note questions the continued significance of land and the escape requirement once liability is understood as resting on the creation of exceptional risks of harm. It further argues that the Committee’s formulation of the dangerousness requirement leaves unresolved questions about the interaction between the probability and severity of harm, while questioning the extent to which the specialised-use requirement performs independent work. Finally, the note contends that the Committee’s justificatory analysis, although a valuable starting point, falls short of providing a satisfactory theoretical foundation for the reconstructed doctrine. The decision nevertheless marks a turning point in the modern law of Rylands v Fletcher.
Marco Cappelletti, Rylands v Fletcher Redux: Rubis Bahamas Ltd v Russell, Modern Law Review. First published: 3 September 2026.
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