ABSTRACT
This chapter assesses whether tort liability can have a deterrent effect and reduce risky and harmful behaviour. It discusses insights from key reviews of empirical work across regulatory domains. These reviews show that this body of empirical work, in all but one of the domains (corporate director liability towards shareholders) studied, does not find conclusive evidence that tort deters or that it does not deter. Studies do find some indication of negative side effects of tort regimes, such as lowering necessary services, enhancing unnecessary legal defensive practices and raising costs. The chapter concludes that common assumptions about the role tort can play in compliance require a more solid empirical basis. The chapter presents directions for future tort and deterrence research with a focus on better understanding the causal processes through which liability rules may shape human and organizational conduct.
van Rooij, Benjamin and Brownlee, Megan, Does Tort Deter? Inconclusive Empirical Evidence about the Effect of Liability in Preventing Harmful Behaviour (March 29, 2020) in B Van Rooij and DD Sokol (eds), Cambridge Handbook on Compliance, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press; UC Irvine School of Law Research Paper No 2020-26.
First posted 2020-04-10 06:42:55
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