Charlie Webb, ‘Three Concepts of Rights, Two of Property’

Abstract
Sometimes rights are taken to describe concrete, bottom-line entitlements, sometimes a kind of ground of such entitlements. I suggest that this difference reflects not so much disagreement or uncertainty as to the nature of rights as different applications and senses of the term ‘right’, each expressing a different idea or concept. Much work on rights is compromised by a failure to distinguish these concepts of a right, nowhere more so than in private law, where it accounts for difficulties lawyers have faced when seeking to distinguish personal (in personam) and proprietary (in rem) rights.

Charlie Webb, Three Concepts of Rights, Two of Property, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqy006. Published: 23 March 2018.

First posted 2018-03-27 05:48:41

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