Abstract:
Luck egalitarianism’s ascent has focused attention on the role that individual choice plays in distributive justice, for the theory invests fundamental moral significance in the distinction between choice and luck. But the theory’s supposed signal virtue has also been the target of withering criticism. Most prominently, Elizabeth Anderson has argued that the foundational role that the theory accords to the distinction between choice and luck is fatal to the theory. In what GA Cohen aptly calls her “broadside” against the theory, Anderson categorically – and I believe persuasively – rejects the role that luck egalitarianism accords to choice so conceived.
While Anderson and those who have followed her lead make a convincing case that the luck egalitarian account of distributive justice fails, however, it would be a mistake to dismiss the importance of choice to distributive justice on the force of those criticisms. For what luck egalitarianism valorizes and Anderson denigrates is a particular – and particularly formal – conception of choice. Indeed, it is striking that although the formal fact or authenticity of people’s choices is the sine qua non of luck egalitarianism, the actual substance or content of people’s choices is strictly irrelevant according to the view. Anderson quite rightly criticizes luck egalitarianism’s crime of commission, consisting in making so much of whether a distributive outcome can be traced to individuals’ choices. But in my view, luck egalitarianism is no less guilty of a crime of omission, for it fails to give due regard for what choices are made. Anderson, interestingly, is equally guilty of this charge. It is my aim here to substantiate these claims and thus to argue that distributive justice must take seriously the substance or content of individuals’ choices: specifically, justice demands that the state should indemnify people against distributive disadvantages that individuals suffer in virtue of choosing to pursue worthwhile activities.
My aim is to make the case for a novel conception of distributive justice, turning not on the authenticity of people’s choices but on the substantive content, and specifically the value, of their choices. This marks out my view as perfectionist. While general political perfectionism has been examined and defended in detail, its implications for distributive justice have been largely overlooked. The goal of this essay, then, is to correct that oversight by sketching a liberal perfectionist account of distributive justice.
Oberdiek, John, Perfecting Distributive Justice (September 25, 2014).
First posted 2014-09-28 09:56:27
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