Shay Lavie, ‘Quotas’

Abstract
The Article addresses simple yet surprisingly overlooked questions – could numerical caps on legal rights be a valuable regulatory mechanism? In which circumstances should we employ them? It is the first to discuss numerical caps – quotas – as a distinct regulatory instrument, and the lessons it provides are pertinent to numerous legal settings. The Article first sets out the theoretical framework for using quotas. It does so by synthesizing real-world examples and fleshing out the reasons for choosing quotas, especially non-tradable, over other regulatory alternatives, such as prices. Armed with the theoretical insights, the Article then suggests practical implications. In particular, capping the right to access courts through quotas can be valuable in balancing some of the conflicts that the American legal system faces. Such quotas restrict overuse of courts and push litigants to carefully invoke their rights, and they simultaneously guarantee a wide access to courts without imposing fees. Accordingly, the Article analyzes several litigation contexts – such as interlocutory appeals and pleading standards – in which policymakers can benefit from quotas.

Lavie, Shay, Quotas (December 5, 2018). Journal of Law and Politics, volume 34, 2018.

First posted 2018-12-28 07:07:18

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